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FINDING THE RIGHT INSURANCE POLICY: A UNIFORM 
SET OF GUIDELINES FOR APPLYING THE BURFORD 
ABSTENTION DOCTRINE IN CASES INVOLVING STATE 
INSURANCE INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS 
ABSTRACT 
When a party moves for a federal court to invoke the Burford abstention 
doctrine to stay a case or remand it to state court, the court must determine if 
hearing the case will substantially disrupt a state’s efforts to achieve a goal of 
public importance through a complex administrative scheme. Federal courts 
often reject motions to abstain from hearing a case on Burford grounds due to 
the compelling nature of mandatory jurisdiction. Accordingly, the United 
States Supreme Court has characterized the doctrine of abstention as “an 
extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty of a District Court to 
adjudicate a controversy properly before it.” 
However, there is one area of law where courts often apply Burford 
abstention: cases involving a party undergoing a state insurance insolvency 
proceeding. This tendency for federal courts to stay or remand cases in 
deference to state proceedings in the insurance insolvency context derives from 
a longstanding Congressional policy of allowing states to regulate the 
insurance industry as embodied by the McCarran-Ferguson Act and the 
exclusion of insurance companies from the Bankruptcy Code. 
This Comment will examine the processes used by different courts to 
determine whether to invoke Burford abstention and propose the adoption of a 
formula that builds upon a set of factors developed by the Tenth Circuit Court 
of Appeals to also address additional concerns. The proposed formula draws 
from case law and the policy goals underlying Burford abstention while 
emphasizing the role of avoiding the disruption of a state’s efforts to establish 
insolvency proceedings for insurance companies. Through a six-part test, 
Courts can properly navigate the application of the “troublesome and 
enigmatic” Burford abstention doctrine. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that you are badly injured following a serious car accident and 
desperately need the coverage that you are entitled to under your health 
insurance policy. Unfortunately, your insurance company, which is based in 
Georgia, is undergoing a state insolvency proceeding following financial 
difficulty. The Georgia Life & Health Guaranty Association covers a 
maximum of $300,000 per individual when an insurance company cannot 
provide coverage due to insolvency,1 but you need significantly more than that 
to pay your medical bills. Suddenly, a third party files a lawsuit in federal court 
against your insurance company through diversity jurisdiction. If the case 
proceeds, a verdict for the plaintiff could jeopardize the ability of your 
insurance company to provide for your expenses. However, there is a solution: 
the federal court could apply the rarely-invoked Burford abstention doctrine, 
dismissing the lawsuit or staying it until the insolvency proceeding has ended, 
which potentially frees up the funds necessary to pay for your expenses. 
The Supreme Court established the Burford abstention doctrine in 1943,2 
but for many years courts rarely invoked it.3 However, there is an exception: 
federal courts often apply Burford abstention in cases involving an insurance 
company undergoing a state insolvency proceeding.4 One factor favoring 
federal abstention in this context is the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which 
provides that the states handle the regulation of “the business of insurance.”5 
Another factor is the exclusion of insurance companies from the Bankruptcy 
Code, which reinforces the significance of the development and administration 
 
 1 Ga. Code Ann. § 33-38-7 (LEXIS Through the 2016 Regular Session). 
 2 Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943). 
 3 Georgene M. Vairo, Making Younger Civil: The Consequences of Federal Court Deference to State 
Court Proceedings – A Response to Professor Stravitz, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 173, 180–81 (1989) (discussing 
how Burford abstention was rarely invoked until a “renaissance” in the lower courts in the 1980s as 
exemplified by a federal court’s invocation of the doctrine in the context of a state insurance insolvency 
proceeding in Law Insurance Co. v. Corcoran, 807 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1017 
(1987)); see Leonard Birdson, Comity and Our Federalism in the Twenty-First Century: The Abstention 
Doctrines Will Always Be With Us - Get Over It!!, 36 CREIGHTON L. REV. 375, 419 (noting that between 2000 
and 2003, Burford abstention was only invoked in three of the twelve federal appellate courts cases where it 
was considered). 
 4 See, e.g., Levy v. Lewis, 635 F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1980); Corcoran v. Ardra Ins. Co., 842 F.2d 31 (2nd 
Cir. 1988) (abrogated in part by Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 710 (1996)); Clark v. 
Fitzgibbons, 103 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 1997); Lentz v. Trinchard, 730 F. Supp. 2d 567 (E.D. La. 2010); cf. 
Brandenburg v. Seidel, 859 F.2d 1179, 1191 (1988) (the risk of disrupting a complex state scheme for the 
insolvency of state-charted savings and loan associations “presents a classic situation for Burford abstention”). 
But see, e.g., Bilden v. United Equitable Ins. Co., 921 F.2d 822 (8th Cir. 1990). 
 5 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (2012). 
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of insolvency-related insurance regulation by the states.6 Nonetheless, different 
federal courts often use different approaches to determine whether to abstain 
from hearing a case involving a party undergoing a state insurance insolvency 
proceeding on Burford grounds.7 
To address the problematic inconsistency resulting from the application of 
these alternate methodologies, this Comment proposes that federal courts 
deciding whether to abstain on Burford grounds apply a set of factors that 
builds upon the formula used by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Grimes 
v. Crown Life Ins. Co. to address diversity and equity concerns. This approach 
entails the evaluation of six questions: (1) whether the cause of action is 
entirely federal; (2) whether resolving the suit requires the court to interfere 
with state policies related to insurance insolvency proceedings; (3) whether the 
state procedures indicate the presence of a state forum to adjudicate these 
issues; (4) whether difficult or unusual state laws are at issue; (5) whether the 
court is sitting in equity; and (6) whether, in a case brought to a federal court 
through diversity jurisdiction, the state that would hear it on a remand has a 
vested interest in its specific outcome. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Insurance Regulation on the State Level 
In 1869, the Supreme Court first adopted the view that states are 
responsible for regulating the insurance industry in Paul v. Virginia.8 Seventy-
five years later, the Supreme Court changed direction in United States v. 
South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, holding that the business of insurance 
constituted interstate commerce subject to federal regulation. 9 In response to 
 
 6 11 U.S.C. §§ 109(b)(2), (d) (2012). 
 7 Compare Fragoso v. Lope, 991 F.2d 878, 885–86 (1st Cir. 1993) (declining to apply Burford 
abstention in the context of a state insolvency proceeding), with Lac D’Amiante Du Quebec, Ltee v. Am. 
Home Assur. Co., 864 F.2d 1033, 1048 (3d Cir. 1988) (finding Burford abstention so clearly warranted in a 
case involving a party to an insurance insolvency proceeding as to reverse a district court’s decision not to 
invoke it). 
 8 See Willy E. Rice, Federal Courts and The Regulation of The Insurance Industry: An Empirical and 
Historical Analysis Of Courts’ Ineffectual Attempts To Harmonize Federal Antitrust, Arbitration, and 
Insolvency Statutes With the Mccarran Ferguson Act-1941-1993, 43 CATH. U.L. REV. 1 399, 399–400 (1994); 
Paul v. Virginia 75 U.S. 168, 183–86 (1869); see also Sims v. Fid. Assurance Ass’n, 129 F.2d 442, 448 (4th 
Cir. 1942) (noting that insurance companies are exempted from the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 30 Stat. 544 
(1898) (superseded by 95 Pub. L. No. 598 (1978)), aff’d, 318 U.S. 608 (1943)). 
 9 See Rice, supra note 8, at 400; United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n. 322 U.S. 533 
(1944); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“Congress shall have the Power . . . to regulate Commerce . . . 
among the several States . . . .”). 
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the threat of federal antitrust actions against insurance companies brought 
about by this holding, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners 
helped formulate and successfully push for Congress to pass the McCarran-
Ferguson Act to keep the regulation of the insurance industry at the state 
level.10 The McCarran-Ferguson Act reads: 
Declaration of policy - The Congress hereby declares that the 
continued regulation and taxation by the several States of the 
business of insurance is in the public interest, and that silence on the 
part of the Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to 
the regulation or taxation of such business by the several States.11 
Despite some calls to repeal the McCarran-Ferguson Act to allow for more 
federal regulation,12 its embodiment of Congress’s policy of leaving states to 
regulate “the business of insurance” remains intact.13 
Judicial interpretations of the savings clause of the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”)14 illustrate how the courts have 
acknowledged Congress’s policy to have states control the regulation of the 
insurance industry.15 ERISA includes notoriously complex pre-emption 
provisions declaring that it supersedes conflicting state laws,16 but it also 
contains a savings clause ensuring that “nothing in this title shall be construed 
to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates 
insurance, banking, or securities.”17 However, referencing language from the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act,18 ERISA prohibits certain employee benefit plans 
from qualifying as engaged in the “business of insurance” and thus are exempt 
from pre-emption.19 
 
 10 Herbert H. Naujoks, Eight Years After S.E.U.A. – Present Status of the Regulation of Insurance as 
Commerce, 35 MARQ. L. REV. 339, 348 (1952); Proceedings of the NAIC, 75th Sess. 226 (1944); Proceedings 
of the NAIC, 76th Sess. 250 (1945); 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (2012). 
 11 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (2012). 
 12 See, e.g., Jere W. Glover, Should Congress Repeal McCarran-Ferguson?: It’s Time to 
Repeal McCarran-Ferguson, 1 ANTITRUST 31, 33 (1987). 
 13 See, e.g., Wolfson v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 51 F.3d 141, 147 (8th Cir. 1995) (noting in a 
decision to invoke Burford abstention that “[t]here is a strong federal policy of deferring to state regulation of 
the insurance industry . . . .”). 
 14 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2012). 
 15 See Karen A. Jordan, ERISA Preemption: Integrating FABE into the Savings Clause Analysis, 27 
RUTGERS L.J. 273, 274–77 (1996). 
 16 See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2012). 
 17 Id. § 1144(b)(2)(A). 
 18 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (2012) (“Congress hereby declares that the continued regulation and taxation by the 
several States of the business of insurance is in the public interest . . . .”). 
 19 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (2012). 
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The Supreme Court construed the ERISA savings clause broadly in 
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts, establishing the use of three 
criteria for determining if a particular practice falls within the “business of 
insurance” for the purposes of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. These factors 
relate to whether the practice (1) transfers or spreads a policyholder’s risk, (2) 
is an integral part of the insurer-insured policy relationship, and (3) is limited 
to entities in the insurance industry.20 This relatively rigid framework fits with 
the narrow interpretations of the “business of insurance” for the purposes of 
ERISA preemption exemptions in several earlier Supreme Court cases.21  
Over twenty years after Metropolitan Life, however, the Supreme Court 
revised its approach, making “a clean break from the McCarran-Ferguson 
factors.”22 Instead, the Supreme Court held that a state law qualifies for an 
ERISA pre-emption exemption on insurance grounds if it is: (1) specifically 
directed towards entities engaged in insurance, and (2) substantially affects the 
risk pooling arrangement between the insurer and the insured.23 This open-
ended, two-step process not only follows Congress’s desire to have the states 
regulate insurance companies, but demonstrates the Supreme Court “loosening 
the tight grip on what is considered a state insurance regulation.”24 
B. Exclusion of Insurance Companies from the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy 
Historically, there has been no original or exclusive mention of insurance 
companies in the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure or the Code. 
Congress’s power to regulate bankruptcy originates in the Constitution, which 
declares that Congress shall have the power to establish “uniform Laws on the 
subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.”25 After several short-
lived and ineffective attempts at establishing uniform federal bankruptcy 
provisions, Congress passed the Bankruptcy Act of 1867 in the turmoil that 
followed the Panic of 1857 and the American Civil War.26 The Bankruptcy Act 
 
 20 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (2012); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Mass., 471 U.S. 724, 743 (1985) (quoting 
Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 129 (1982)). 
 21 See Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979); Union Labor Life Ins. Co. 
v. Pireno 458 U.S. 119 (1982). 
 22 Kentucky Ass’n of Health Plans v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329, 341 (2003). 
 23 Id. at 341–42. 
 24 Matthew G. Vansuch, Not Just Old Wine in New Bottles: Kentucky Ass‘n of Health Plans, Inc. v. 
Miller Bottles a New Test for State Regulation of Insurance, 38 AKRON L. REV. 253, 265 (2005). 
 25 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 26 See Charles Jordan Tabb, The History Of The Bankruptcy Laws In The United States, 3 AM. BANKR. 
INST. L. REV. 5, 19 (1995); Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517, repealed by Act of June 7, 1878, ch. 
160, 20 Stat. 99 (1878). 
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of 1867 applied to insurance companies,27 but the 1898 Bankruptcy Act’s 
reworking of bankruptcy law did not include insurance companies in its list of 
eligible businesses and corporations.28  
Twelve years later, a 1910 amendment added language allowing insurance 
companies to be eligible to file for bankruptcy.29 Bankruptcy laws were revised 
yet again in the 1938 Chandler Act, which established the chapters that 
categorized types of bankruptcy over the next forty years.30 The next major 
relevant development occurred in 1944’s United States v. South-Eastern 
Underwriters Ass’n, where the Supreme Court reversed Paul v. Virginia31 to 
hold that the insurance industry is engaged in interstate commerce.32 
The decision to hold insurance industry practices as interstate commerce 
prompted the National Association of Insurance Commissioners to push for the 
passage of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.33 In reversing Paul v. Virginia, the 
Supreme Court revisited the earliest argument in favor of excluding insurance 
companies from federal regulation: that insurance contracts are not an item in 
commerce.34 By holding that insurance contracts are interstate commerce in 
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, the Supreme Court upheld 
the validity of criminal indictments made against two hundred companies and 
twenty-seven individuals for violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act,35 
allowing the Act to apply to insurance company practices.36 Both insurance 
companies and state insurance regulators rallied in opposition to the decision. 
Insurance companies rallied to avoid antitrust liability and state insurance 
regulators wanted to retain power in notwithstanding the ruling.37 
 
 27 Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517, repealed by Act of June 7, 1878, ch. 160, 20 Stat. 99 
(1878). 
 28 See Laura S. McAlister, The Inefficiencies of Exclusion: the Importance of Including Insurance 
Companies in The Bankruptcy Code, 24 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 129, 135 (2008); Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 
541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978). 
 29 See McAlister, supra note 28; Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 412, 36 Stat. 838 (1910). 
 30 See Tabb, supra note 26, at 29; Act of June 22, 1938, 52 Stat. 840 (1938). 
 31 Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869). 
 32 South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n., 322 U.S. 533. 
 33 See Naujoks, supra note 10; 75 NAIC, supra note 10; 76 NAIC, supra note 10; 15 U.S.C. § 1011 
(2012). 
 34 See Frank P. Darr, Federal Claims in Insurance Insolvencies, 25 TORT & INS. L.J. 601, 604 (1989–
1990); Paul, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168. 
 35 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (1890). 
 36 South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n., 322 U.S. at 534. 
 37 See 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (2012); Darr, supra note 34.  
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The Congressional record indicates that in passing the McCarran-Ferguson 
Act, Congress aimed to avoid interference with state policy and believed that 
states were better equipped to handle the localized nature of the insurance 
industry because states already maintained appropriate regulatory systems.38 
While Congress may have been more concerned with the effects of federal 
antitrust enforcement than maintaining state regulatory authority,39 the law that 
it passed still broadly declared that “the continued regulation and taxation by 
the several States of the business of insurance is in the public interest.”40 
Notably, the McCarran-Ferguson Act only gave states control over the 
regulation of “the business of insurance.”41 
Finally, the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 197842 established national 
bankruptcy guidelines that, with plenty of amendments and revisions, prevail 
today as the Code.43 The Code excludes insurance companies, but does so in a 
roundabout manner.44 For example, the Code lists insurance companies as 
ineligible for chapter 7 liquidation proceedings.45 Insurance companies do not 
fit the qualifications for bankruptcy under chapter 9, which is intended for 
municipalities.46 Because an insurance company is not a railroad, a person that 
may be a debtor under chapter 7, an uninsured state member bank, or a 
corporation under 25A of the Federal Reserve Act, it is not eligible for 
bankruptcy under chapter 11.47 Similarly, insurance companies do not meet the 
requirements for eligibility under chapters 12 (for farmers or fishermen) or 13 
(for individuals with regular income).48  
With insurance companies entirely excluded from the Code, each state has 
its own insurance regulatory scheme to address their insolvencies.49 States 
 
 38 See Linda M. Lent, McCarran-Ferguson in Perspective, 48 INS. COUNSEL J. 411, 412 (1981). 
 39 See Darr, supra note 34, at 607. 
 40 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (2012). 
 41 See Lent, supra note 38, at 413; South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n. 322 U.S. 533 (discussing how the 
limitations of “the business of insurance” imply that Paul v. Virginia may not be entirely overruled); see also 
SEC v. Nat’l Sec., 393 U.S. 453, 460 (1969) (“Statutes aimed at protecting or regulating this relationship, 
directly or indirectly, are laws regulating the business of insurance.”) 
 42 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, §101 (1978). 
 43 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532 (2012). See generally Kenneth N. Klee, Legislative History of The New 
Bankruptcy Law, 28 DEPAUL L. REV. 941 (1979). 
 44 See generally 11 U.S.C. § 109 (2012). 
 45 Id. § 109 (b)(2). 
 46 Id. § 109 (c)(1). 
 47 Id. § 109 (d). 
 48 Id. §§ 109 (f), (e). 
 49 See Karl L. Rubinstein, The Legal Standing of an Insurance Insolvency Receiver: When the Shoe 
Doesn’t Fit, 10 CONN. INS. L.J. 309, 317 (2004). 
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often develop these schemes to resemble models created by the National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners.50 The various statutes require that a 
Commissioner be appointed to oversee the insolvent company’s estate in 
unique processes parallel to yet those proscribed by the Code.51 
C. The Burford Abstention Doctrine 
Abstention doctrines are exceptions to otherwise mandatory federal 
jurisdiction requirements that determine when a federal court should refrain 
from hearing a case in favor of allowing the dispute to resolve in a state 
proceeding.52 The term “abstention” was first applied in this context in 1941 in 
Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Company.53 Burford abstention is 
merely one of “four primary abstention doctrines” that “[t]he Supreme Court 
has recognized,”54 and certain federal codes even address abstention directly.55 
Burford abstention allows a federal court to abstain from exercising its 
jurisdiction in deference to complex state administrative procedures.56 Due to 
its complicated interpretation and application, the doctrine has been called 
“troublesome and enigmatic.”57  
The genesis of the Buford abstention doctrine arises from a dispute over a 
state’s issuance of oil drilling permits. The Supreme Court heard Burford v. 
Sun Oil after an appeal of a decision by the Railroad Commission of Texas to 
 
 50 See id. 
 51 See id. at 317–18; e.g., Cal. Ins. Code §1037 (2016); O.C.G.A. § 33-37-13 (2016); see also 
McAlister, supra note 28, at 130–36 (describing typical state insurance insolvency proceedings). 
 52 Gordon G. Young, Federal Court Abstention and State Administration Law from Burford to 
Ankenbrandt: Fifty Years of Judicial Federalism under Burford v. Sun Oil Co. and Kindred Doctrines, 42 
DEPAUL L. REV. 859, 862–63 (1993). 
 53 Railroad Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941) (“These cases reflect a doctrine 
of abstention appropriate to our federal system whereby the federal courts, exercising a wise discretion, 
restrain their authority because of scrupulous regard for the rightful independence of the state governments and 
for the smooth working of the federal judiciary.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Young, supra note 
52, at 863.  
 54 Michael Ashley Stein, The Domestic Relations Exception To Federal Jurisdiction: Rethinking An 
Unsettled Federal Courts Doctrine, 36 B.C.L. REV. 669, 694–95 (1994–1995) (identifying Pullman, Burford, 
Younger, and Colorado River abstention as the most prominent abstention doctrines recognized by the 
Supreme Court); see Young, supra note 52, at 868 (citing the same four “major varieties of abstention” and 
adding a fifth, Thibodaux abstention). 
 55 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2) (2012) (addressing mandatory abstention); 28 U.S.C. § 1452(b) (2012) 
(addressing equitable abstention). Note that both provisions address situations not related to Buford abstention 
in the context of insurance insolvency proceedings, as both statutes apply to situations covered by the Code. 
 56 See Stephen W. Sather, Resolving Conflicts Between Bankruptcy and Administrative Law, 11 TEX. 
TECH. ADMIN. L.J. 267, 272 (2010). 
 57 Young, supra note 52, at 863.  
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grant the right to drill four oil wells to a small oil company.58 Sun Oil Co. 
alleged that the Railroad Commission violated their due process rights under 
the Fourteenth Amendment by unfairly denying them the right to drill the 
wells, and brought the suit to federal court through federal question and 
diversity of citizenship.59 The Court cited “confusion,” “[d]elay, 
misunderstanding of local law, and needless conflict with state policy” as 
resulting from a federal court’s intrusion into a “well organized system of 
regulation and review which the Texas statutes provide.”60 The Court 
concluded that given these factors and the expertise of the state agency, “a 
sound respect for the independence of state action requires the federal equity 
court to stay its hand.”61 The Court abstained from hearing the case, despite the 
fact that, as the Court noted thirty-three years later, “the reasonableness of the 
permit . . . was not of transcendent importance.”62 
The Burford abstention doctrine has been commented on and altered by the 
Supreme Court in several subsequent decisions.63 In County of Allegheny v. 
Frank Mashuda Co., the Court generally limited the reach of abstention 
doctrines: 
The doctrine of abstention, under which a District Court may decline 
to exercise or postpone the exercise of its jurisdiction, is an 
extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty of a District Court to 
adjudicate a controversy properly before it. Abdication of the 
obligation to decide cases can be justified under this doctrine only in 
the exceptional circumstances where the order to the parties to repair 
to the state court would clearly serve an important countervailing 
interest.64 
The Court incorporated the “extraordinary and narrow exception” language 
from Allegheny into its holding in Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. 
United States.65 In Colorado River, the Court held that no previously 
recognized abstention doctrine fit with the facts of the case, but that principles 
 
 58 Burford, 319 U.S. 315. 
 59 Id. at 315. 
 60 Id. at 329. 
 61 Id. at 334. 
 62 Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976). 
 63 See County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188–89 (1959); Colorado River 
Water Conservation Dist., 424 U.S. at 813–19 (1976); New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New 
Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 361 (1989); Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 728. 
 64 County of Allegheny, 360 U.S. at 188–89. 
 65 Colorado River Water Conservation Dist., 424 U.S. 800. 
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of avoiding duplicitous litigation and wisely allocating judicial resources 
merited creating and applying a new one.66 
The Court continued to alter its approach to Burford abstention. In New 
Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of New Orleans (hereinafter “NOPSI”), 
the Court refused to apply Burford abstention on the grounds that the case did 
not involve a state law claim or the assertion of a federal claim being entangled 
with a state claim.67 The Court incorporated language from Colorado River to 
create a new definition of Burford abstention: 
Where timely and adequate state-court review is available, a federal 
court sitting in equity must decline to interfere with the proceedings 
or orders of state administrative agencies: (1) when there are 
“difficult questions of state law bearing on policy problems of 
substantial public import whose importance transcends the result in 
the case then at bar”; or (2) where the “exercise of federal review of 
the question in a case and in similar cases would be disruptive of 
state efforts to establish a coherent policy with respect to a matter of 
substantial public concern.”68 
While some courts have interpreted the NOPSI decision as sharply limiting the 
applicability of the Burford doctrine, other courts disagree.69 Lastly, in 
Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance Co., the Supreme Court directly applied 
language from Allegheny and Colorado River to characterize Burford 
abstention as only an “extraordinary and narrow exception to a district court’s 
duty to adjudicate a controversy properly before it.”70 Thus, the NOPSI 
 
 66 Id. at 813–19. 
 67 New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350 (1989). 
 68 Id. at 361 (quoting Colorado River Water Conservation Dist., 424 U.S. at 813–15); see also HENRY 
MELVIN HART, JR. AND HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, 1077–79 
(6th. Ed. 2009) (suggesting that the court’s Burford formulation applies when a state court works as a de facto 
partner of a state administrative agency in developing regulatory policy). 
 69 See Sevigny v. Emp’rs. Ins. of Wausau, 411 F.3d 24, 27 (1st Cir. 2005) (“NOPSI also contains a 
general reformulation of Burford, often quoted, that can be read expansively or narrowly and is ultimately 
ambiguous”). Compare Fragoso, 991 F.2d at 882 (1st Cir. 1993) (“NOPSI cabins the operation of the Burford 
doctrine. Post-NOPSI Burford applies only in narrowly circumscribed situations where deference to a state’s 
administrative processes for the determination of complex, policy-laden, state-law issues would serve a 
significant local interest and would render federal-court review inappropriate.”), and University of Md. v. Peat 
Marwick Main & Co., 923 F.2d 265, 272 (“It is clear that, after NOPSI, federal courts should be more wary of 
extending the scope of Burford abstention.”), with Clark v. Fitzgibbons, 105 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 1997) 
(holding that the NOPSI decision does not abrogate the rule favoring Burford abstention in deference to state 
insurance insolvency proceedings). 
 70 Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 728 (1996) (quoting Colorado River Water Conservation Dist., 424 U.S. at 
813) (quoting County of Allegheny, 360 U.S. at 188–89). 
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definition, qualified by Quackenbush, governs the application of the Burford 
abstention doctrine today.71 
D. Burford Abstention in the Equity Context 
In Burford v. Sun Oil, the majority opinion specified that under the 
circumstances of the case, “sound respect for the independence of state action 
requires the federal equity court to stay its hand.”72 Courts have debated 
whether the presence of a “federal equity court” in this sentence cabins 
Burford abstention to instances where the court can only provide equitable 
remedies.73 The Supreme Court addressed this issue extensively in the context 
of various abstention doctrines in Quackenbush.74 The Court summarized its 
conclusion as follows: 
We have thus held that in cases where the relief being sought is 
equitable in nature or otherwise discretionary, federal courts not only 
have the power to stay the action based on abstention principles, but 
can also, in otherwise appropriate circumstances, decline to exercise 
jurisdiction altogether by either dismissing the suit or remanding it to 
state court. By contrast, while we have held that federal courts may 
stay actions for damages based on abstention principles, we have not 
held that those principles support the outright dismissal or remand of 
damages actions.75 
Thus, the Court in Quackenbush clarified that a federal court sitting in equity 
can invoke an abstention doctrine to decline to exercise jurisdiction, dismiss a 
suit, or remand the suit to a state forum. By contrast, a federal court in a 
damages action may stay an action on abstention grounds, but not dismiss or 
remand one. This basic framework functions as a foundation for more complex 
cases featuring claims for both equitable relief and monetary damages, where 
 
 71 See New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 491 U.S. 350; Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 728 (1996) (quoting 
Colorado River Water Conservation Dist., 424 U.S. at 813) (quoting County of Allegheny, 360 U.S. at 188–
89). 
 72 Burford, 319 U.S. at 334 (emphasis added). 
 73 Compare Lac D’Amiante du Quebec, Ltee, 864 F.2d at 1045 (Burford abstention appropriate in case 
seeking declaratory relief), and Brandenburg, 859 F.2d at 1192 n.17 (Burford abstention appropriate in action 
for damages), and Wolfson, 51 F.3d at 147 (same), with Fragoso, 991 F.2d at 882 (Burford abstention 
inappropriate in a torts action), University of Md., 923 F.2d at 272 (citing New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 491 
U.S. 350) (NOPSI limits the application of Burford abstention when the court is not sitting in equity), and 
Baltimore Bank for Coops. v. Farmer’s Cheese Coop., 583 F.2d 104, 111 (3rd Cir. 1978). 
 74 Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 721–27. 
 75 Id. at 721. 
RIES_COMMENT GALLEYPROOFS2 12/21/2017 2:05 PM 
176 EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 34 
the prominence of the equitable claim favors abstaining and the prominence of 
monetary damages supports not abstaining.76 
II. ANALYSIS 
This section will explore the necessity of a uniform set of criteria for 
determining when it is appropriate to apply the Burford abstention doctrine. 
The first subsection will identify the significance of Burford abstention to state 
insurance insolvency proceedings. The second subsection will dispute claims 
that NOPSI and Quackenbush have limited the scope of Buford abstention. The 
third subsection will examine competing formulas for determining the 
application of Burford abstention developed by the Fifth Circuit and the Tenth 
Circuit. The fourth subsection will propose a formulation for judges to 
consider when determining whether or not to abstain on Burford grounds that 
echoes and expands upon the concerns expressed by the Court of Appeals for 
the Tenth Circuit in Grimes.77 This fourth subsection will examine the 
proposed criteria as they relate to the policy concerns behind the Burford 
abstention doctrine, the reasons for the exclusion of insurance companies from 
the Code, and the text of relevant laws and codes. The fourth subsection will 
also contrast the proposed set of factors with sets developed by other courts, 
particularly the Fifth Circuit’s Wilson formulation.78 
A. The Role of States in Bankruptcy and Burford in the State Insurance 
Insolvency Context 
Before the ratification of the Constitution, the States (as they existed at the 
time) passed a wide variety of short-term bankruptcy laws of varying types and 
effectiveness.79 The language of the Constitution appears to counter this 
disparate situation by granting widespread power to the federal government to 
 
 76 See, e.g., Wolfson, 51 F.3d at 147 (“No doubt abstention is less apt to be appropriate when the federal 
plaintiff seeks money damages, but we do not read the Supreme Court’s abstention jurisprudence as 
completely foreclosing abstention in money damage cases.”); see also General Glass Indus. Corp. v. Monsour 
Med. Found., 973 F.2d 197 (3rd. Cir. 1992) (in a case involving monetary damages and a party involved in a 
state insurance insolvency proceeding, vacating a lower court’s decision to dismiss and remand on Burford 
grounds, but imposing a stay on Burford grounds). 
 77 Grimes v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 857 F.2d 699, 705 (10th Cir. 1988). 
 78 Wilson v. Valley Elec. Membership Corp., 8 F.3d 311, 314–16 (5th Cir. 1993). 
 79 See BRUCE H. MANN, REPUBLIC OF DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY IN THE AGE OF AMERICAN 
INDEPENDENCE, 59–61 (2002) (describing pre-Constitution bankruptcy laws in New York, Rhode Island, and 
Connecticut); Thomas E. Plank, The Constitutional Limits of Bankruptcy, 63 TENN. L. REV. 487, 518–26 
(1996) (discussing the different approaches adopted by all thirteen states before the adoption and ratification of 
the Constitution). 
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legislate in the area of bankruptcy, as it allows Congress to establish “uniform 
Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.”80 
However, federal bankruptcy laws have historically carved out areas where the 
state retains control,81 and the Supreme Court has affirmed these exceptions 
against claims that they violated the federal government’s power to set uniform 
laws on the subject.82 Today, the clear exclusion of insurance companies from 
the Code indicates a policy of allowing states to maintain control over their 
insolvency proceedings.83 The Code may abstractly indicate a Congressional 
desire for uniformity in most circumstances, but, in practice, the results of 
filings for bankruptcy have often varied enormously depending on the state.84 
The preservation of state control over insurance insolvency proceedings 
through the application of Burford abstention fits within this fractured 
framework. 
Nonetheless, the adoption of a unified formula for choosing when to apply 
Burford abstention would provide desirable predictability, especially if such a 
formula emphasized the policy goals behind the doctrine. Nowhere would such 
a framework be more helpful than in the realm of federal cases involving a 
party undergoing a state insurance insolvency proceeding, where similar facts 
have often resulted in different decisions regarding Burford abstention.85 As 
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit pointed out in Callon Petroleum Co. 
v. Frontier Insurance Co., “Although Burford abstention is generally 
considered the exception rather than the rule, the insurance insolvency context 
presents the classic example of the doctrine’s goal of preventing ‘needless 
conflict with state policy.’”86 
 
 80 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (emphasis added). 
 81 See Plank, supra note 79, at 558 (“The concern about uniformity is nonsense. Under both the 
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 and the Bankruptcy Code of 1978, debtors could exempt certain items of their 
property from the claims of creditors. These exemptions are based on the law of the debtors’ state. These state 
law exemptions were and are wildly different.”). 
 82 See, e.g., Hanover Nat’l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181 (1902); Regional Rail Reorganization Act 
Cases, 419 U.S. 102 (1974). 
 83 11 U.S.C. § 109 (2012). 
 84 See generally Daniel A. Austin, Bankruptcy and the Myth of “Uniform Laws”, 42 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 1081 (2012) (discussing how the state and local laws prevent the U.S. Bankruptcy Code and Congress 
from establishing truly uniform bankruptcy laws); see also Ryan Mallone, When Opting Out is the Only 
Option: Protecting Small Business Debtors in Bankruptcy, 4 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 745, 747–49 (2013) 
(describing how many states have adopted unique sets of exemptions and “opted out” of the exemptions list in 
11 U.S.C. § 522 of the Code). 
 85 Compare, e.g., Clark, 105 F.3d 1049, with Fragoso, 991 F.2d 878. 
 86 Callon Petroleum Co. v. Frontier Ins. Co., 351 F.3d 204, 209 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting Burford, 319 
U.S. at 327). See generally Michael A. Knoerzer, Flagging The Obligation: Federal Courts’ Abstention in 
RIES_COMMENT GALLEYPROOFS2 12/21/2017 2:05 PM 
178 EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 34 
Arguments about the appropriateness of Burford abstention arise so often 
in the context of cases involving a party undergoing a state insurance 
insolvency proceeding that the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit sorted 
them into three specific categories.87 The first consists of suits filed by an 
insolvent insurer’s policyholders against a third party where a verdict against 
the third party could somehow impede the ability of the receiver of the 
insolvent insurer (often intervening in the case) to recover on behalf of the 
insurer’s estate.88 The second includes cases filed by an insolvent insurer or its 
receiver where recovery would benefit the insolvent’s estate.89 The third 
category consists of cases filed by creditors, including policyholders and policy 
beneficiaries, against an insolvent insurance company.90 Despite delineating 
these categories, the Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit emphasized the 
importance of eschewing “discrete mechanical tests” in favor of carefully 
balancing “considerations of federalism, comity, and judicial administration” 
as “[a]bstention is inherently a fact-specific inquiry.”91 
B. Burford Post-NOPSI and Quackenbush 
1. Burford and NOPSI 
The Supreme Court’s decisions in NOPSI and Quackenbush have raised 
questions about the viability of the Burford abstention doctrine.92 The 
immensely complex facts of NOPSI relate to a dispute between respondent 
New Orleans City Council and several jointly-owned companies, including 
petitioner New Orleans Public Service, Inc.93 The New Orleans City Council 
denied Petitioner’s request for a rate increase that would have offset payments 
that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission had forced petitioner to make 
to help fund a nuclear reactor.94 A series of lawsuits followed, all dismissed on 
 
Favor of State Rehabilitation And Liquidation Proceedings, 28 TORT & INS. L.J. 837 (1993) (discussing how 
abstention is unusual in cases where a party is not an insolvent insurer or its statutory representative).  
 87 Wolfson, 51 F.3d at 145. 
 88 Id.; see, e.g., General Glass Indus. Corp., 973 F.2d 197 (Burford abstention appropriate where a 
verdict against defendant insurance company would disrupt insolvent insurer receiver’s efforts to recover 
funds). 
 89 Wolfson, 51 F.3d at 145. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. 
 92 New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 491 U.S. 350; Quackenbush, 517 U.S. 706. 
 93 New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 491 U.S. at 352–53. 
 94 Id. at 350.  
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the grounds of ripeness, Burford abstention, or a different abstention 
doctrine.95  
When the dispute finally reached the Supreme Court, Justice Scalia, 
writing for a unanimous Court,96 found no abstention doctrine to apply and 
reversed.97 Scalia refused to apply Younger abstention on the grounds that that 
doctrine, which originated in a criminal case, did not extend to the type of 
actions taken by the New Orleans City Council.98 As to Burford, the Court 
introduced a new definition for the Burford doctrine99 and then refused to 
apply it on the grounds that the facts of the case required an inquiry only into 
the “four corners of the Council’s retail rate order.”100 Such an inquiry would 
not, the Court argued, “disrupt state resolution of distinctively local regulatory 
facts or policies.”101  
Justice Blackmun’s concurrence in NOPSI marks the first of many 
concerns about the majority opinion’s definition of Burford abstention limiting 
its scope.102 As Justice Blackmun wrote, “I find, however, that the majority’s 
understanding of Burford abstention is much narrower than my own in respects 
not relevant to the disposition of this case.”103 Four years later, the Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit, while declining to apply Burford abstention, 
expressed similar concerns: “NOPSI cabins the operation of the Burford 
doctrine. Post-NOPSI Burford applies only in narrowly circumscribed 
situations where deference to a state’s administrative processes for the 
determination of complex, policy-laden, state-law issues would serve a 
significant local interest and would render federal-court review 
inappropriate.”104 On the other hand, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
 
 95 Id. at 352–58. 
 96 Justices Rehnquist, Marshall, Blackmun, and Brennan filed or joined concurring opinions. 
 97 New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 491 U.S. at 373. 
 98 Id. at 367–68 (“Respondents’ case for abstention . . . requires, however, that the Council proceeding 
be the sort of proceeding entitled to Younger treatment. We think it is not.”). 
 99 Id. at 361 (“Where timely and adequate state-court review is available, a federal court sitting in 
equity must decline to interfere with the proceedings or orders of state administrative agencies: (1) when there 
are ‘difficult questions of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial public import whose importance 
transcends the result in the case then at bar’; or (2) where the ‘exercise of federal review of the question in a 
case and in similar cases would be disruptive of state efforts to establish a coherent policy with respect to a 
matter of substantial public concern.’”) (quoting Colorado River Conservation Dist., 424 U.S. at 814).; see 
Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 726–27 (quoting the same passage). 
 100 New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 491 U.S. at 362–63. 
 101 Id. at 363–64. 
 102 Id. at 374 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 103 Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 104 Fragoso, 991 F.2d at 882. 
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argued that NOPSI “has not abrogated the rule favoring abstention in deference 
to state insurance insolvency or liquidation proceedings” and invoked Burford 
abstention in a case involving an insurance company undergoing a state 
insolvency proceeding.105 
The First Circuit, in Sevigny v. Employers Insruance of Wausau, best 
addresses the actual definition presented in NOPSI: “NOPSI also contains a 
general reformulation of Burford, often quoted, that can be read expansively or 
narrowly and is ultimately ambiguous.”106 Indeed, the NOPSI definition does 
little to limit Burford’s scope. The initial policy concerns expressed in Burford 
v. Sun Oil related not just to the mere set of facts immediately before the court, 
but to the larger goal of avoiding the establishment of a precedent of federal 
courts second-guessing the decisions of the highly specialized Texas Railroad 
Commission.107 If parties knew that a decision by the Commission could be 
promptly reversed by a federal court lacking the Commission’s expert 
knowledge, then the policy goals of the State of Texas in the substantially 
important arena of determining the issuance of oil well drilling permits would 
be impeded.108 
Ultimately, the NOPSI definition encapsulates these concerns by noting 
that Burford is appropriate for cases involving either questions not only of state 
law, but also that “transcend the result in the case then at bar” or situations 
where federal review would disrupt a state’s attempt to “establish a coherent 
policy with respect to a matter of substantial public concern.”109 The 
administrative efforts undertaken by each state to create a system that handles 
insurance insolvency proceedings represent precisely the kind of “coherent 
policy with respect to a matter of substantial public concern” described in 
NOPSI.110 
 
 105 Clark, 105 F.3d 1049 (holding that the NOPSI decision does not abrogate the rule favoring Burford 
abstention in deference to state insurance insolvency proceedings). 
 106 Sevigny, 411 F.3d at 27. 
 107 See Burford, 319 U.S. at 332–34 (“Conflicts in the interpretation of state law, dangerous to the 
success of state policies, are almost certain to result from the intervention of the lower federal courts.”). 
 108 See id. (“These questions of regulation of the industry by the state administrative agency, whether 
involving gas or oil prorationing programs or Rule 37 cases, so clearly involves basic problems of Texas 
policy that equitable discretion should be exercised to give the Texas courts the first opportunity to consider 
them.”) 
 109 New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 491 U.S. at 361. 
 110 Id.; see also Clark, 105 F.3d at 1052 (dismissing party’s argument that NOPSI curtails Burford 
abstention in the context of insurance insolvency). 
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2. Burford and Quackenbush 
In Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance Co., the California Insurance 
Commissioner sued Allstate Insurance Company for damages from an alleged 
breach of reinsurance agreements.111 After Allstate removed the case to federal 
court, the California Insurance Commissioner argued to the District Court that 
the case should be remanded to state court under Burford abstention due to the 
significance of the case to California’s regulation of the insurance industry.112 
After the District Court invoked Burford abstention, Allstate appealed to the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which vacated the District Court’s 
decision on the grounds that Burford abstention only applies to equitable, 
rather than damages, actions.113  
The first issue before the Supreme Court was whether a district court’s 
decision to invoke Burford abstention was immediately appealable as a final 
order.114 In a unanimous decision,115 the Court held that the Burford abstention 
was appealable, but that Burford abstention cannot be invoked to dismiss or 
remand in a damages action (though it can be invoked to stay a damages 
action).116 Most significantly, Quackenbush characterized Burford abstention 
as only an “extraordinary and narrow exception to a district court’s duty to 
adjudicate a controversy properly before it.”117 
Like NOPSI, Quackenbush appears on its surface to limit the scope of 
Burford abstention, but it largely only serves to clarify it. While finally 
applying the “extraordinary and narrow exception”118 language to the Burford 
doctrine solidifies its status as the exception rather than the rule, this language 
has been connected to abstention doctrines since 1959.119 Further, the Court’s 
holding in Quackenbush that Burford abstention can only be used to stay, 
 
 111 Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 709. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. at 711–12. 
 114 Id. at 730–31 (“Because this was a damages action, we conclude that the District Court’s remand 
order was an unwarranted application of the Burford doctrine.”). 
 115 Justices Scalia and Kennedy filed concurring opinions, with Justice Kennedy arguing that the 
possibility of invoking Burford abstention in a damages action should be left open and Scalia responding that 
the majority decision precluded such a possibility. Id. at 731–34. 
 116 Id. at 730–31 (holding that “ . . . given the situation the District Court faced in this case, a stay order 
might have been appropriate . . . ” but “federal courts have the power to dismiss or remand cases based on 
abstention principles only where the relief being sought is equitable or otherwise discretionary.”). 
 117 Id. at 728 (quoting Colorado River Water Conservation Dist., 424 U.S. at 813) (quoting County of 
Allegheny, 360 U.S. at 188–89). 
 118 Id. 
 119 See County of Allegheny, 360 U.S. at 188–89. 
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rather than dismiss or remand, a damages action appears at first to be a 
significantly more severe limitation than it actually has proven to be in 
practice.120 Because the issues resolved on the state level typically resemble 
those that a party wishes to have heard in a federal court, issue preclusion and 
claim preclusion often prevent a “stayed” federal case from being heard 
following the resolution of state proceedings.121 Thus, while Quackenbush 
draws clear boundaries around Burford abstention, these lines only intrude 
slightly into the legal realm that Burford had previously inhabited. 
C. Circuit Courts and Burford Tests 
In various decisions, circuit courts have developed ad-hoc analytical tests 
to determine whether to invoke the Burford abstention doctrine.122 In addition, 
two prominent factor-based tests have been developed on the Court of Appeals 
level: the Wilson factors and the Grimes factors. 
1. The Wilson Factors 
In Wilson v. Valley Electric Membership Corp., the Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit developed a five-factor test that was later applied in the 
insurance insolvency context by the District Court for the Eastern District of 
Illinois in Lentz v. Trinchard.123 This test requires an analysis of:  
1) Whether the cause of action arises under federal or state law 2) 
whether the case requires inquiry into unsettled issues of state law, or 
into local facts 3) the importance of the state interest involved 4) the 
state’s need for a coherent policy in that area and 5) the presence of a 
special state forum for judicial review.124 
The facts of Wilson relate to a Louisiana statute that exempted the electric 
power rates of certain rural cooperatives from the regulatory purview of 
Louisiana Public Service Commission.125 After eleven years of the exemption 
preventing the Louisiana Public Service Commission from regulating these 
cooperatives, the Supreme Court of Louisiana held the exemption to be 
 
 120 See Daniel C. Norris, The Final Frontier of Younger Abstention: The Judiciary’s Abdication of the 
Federal Court Removal Jurisdiction Statute, 31 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 193, 210–14 (2003) (arguing that there is 
little practical difference between a dismissal and a stay). 
 121 See id. at 211–12. 
 122 See, e.g., Corcoran, 842 F.2d 31; Law Enforcement Ins. Co. v. Corcoran, 807 F.2d 38 (2nd Cir. 
1986); Bilden v. United Equitable Ins. Co., 921 F.2d 822 (8th Cir. 1990). 
 123 Wilson, 8 F.3d 311; Lentz, 730 F. Supp. 2d 567. 
 124 Wilson, 8 F.3d at 314–17. 
 125 Id. at 312–13.  
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unconstitutional.126 A class action lawsuit was commenced against ten rural 
electric cooperatives in Louisiana, with the proposed class consisting of 
customers, shareholders, and members of the cooperatives.127 The class sought 
refunds of money spent on increased power rates that the cooperatives charged 
due to the Louisiana Public Service Commission’s failure to regulate them 
based on its adherence to the newly unconstitutional statute.128 The defendant 
cooperatives removed the case to federal court.129 
The defendant cooperatives moved for summary judgment on the grounds 
that the decision invalidating the statute130 should only apply prospectively.131 
At this point, the Louisiana Public Service Commission began a review of the 
rates charged by one of the cooperatives.132 The plaintiff class moved for the 
court to invoke Burford abstention to allow the state commission to complete 
its rate review before ruling on the motion for summary judgment and 
proceeding with the case.133 The district court did abstain on Burford grounds, 
leading the defendant to appeal.134 
 In evaluating whether Burford abstention should apply, the Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit drew from a variety of sources to establish the 
five-factor test.135 The court cited NOPSI for its first factor, whether or not the 
cause of action arises under federal or state law.136 Next, the court drew 
primarily from Burford v. Sun Oil for the remaining four factors: whether the 
case requires inquiry into unsettled issues of state law or local facts, the 
importance of the state interest involved, the state’s need for a coherent policy 
in that area, and the presence of a special state forum for judicial review.137 
 
 126 Id. at 313; see Cajun Elec. Power Coop., Inc. v. La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 544 So. 2d 362 (La.) (1989), 
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 991 (1989). 
 127 Wilson, 8 F.3d at 312–13. See generally Wilson v. Valley Elec. Membership Corp., 1992 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 13493 (1992). 
 128 Wilson, 8 F.3d at 313. 
 129 Id. 
 130 See Cajun Elec. Power Coop., Inc., 544 So. 2d 362. 
 131 Wilson, 8 F.3d at 313. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id. 
 135 Id. at 314–16. 
 136 Id. at 314 (citing New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 491 U.S. at 361). 
 137 Id. (citing Burford., 319 U.S. 315); see Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. S. R. Co., 341 U.S. 341 
(1951).  
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The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit applied the factors to the case.138 
The court held that the issues, whether the decision striking down the statute 
should apply retroactively and, if so, whether it invalidates prior rate increases, 
were purely of state law.139 As to the second factor, the court noted that 
deciding the case would require delving into an area of state law that is 
reasonably settled, but also highly complex and localized.140 The court found 
the importance of the state interest to also favor abstention, given that utility 
regulation is a significant state function.141 The court also determined that the 
state does have a need for coherent policy in the area of retroactive application 
of regulation of rural cooperatives, strengthening the case against federal 
intervention.142 Finally, the court held that Louisiana had a special forum for 
rate cases, resulting in the final factor also supporting abstention.143 With all 
five factors favoring Burford abstention, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
ultimately affirmed the lower court decision to invoke it.144 
a. Application of the Wilson Factors 
In Lentz v. Trinchard, the District Court for the Eastern District of 
Louisiana incorporated the Wilson factors for Burford abstention into an 
analysis of a case in the insurance insolvency context.145 The facts of the case 
relate to a detective, Gary Hale, who was insured by American Druggists 
Insurance Company (ADIC).146 ADIC was insured by Northwestern National 
Insurance Company (NNIC), which assumed responsibility for Hale’s policy 
when ADIC became insolvent.147 In 1991, an individual sued Hale on the basis 
of a wrongful murder conviction.148 The resulting multi-million dollar 
judgment forced Hale into involuntary bankruptcy in 2001.149 The trustee 
appointed to oversee Hale’s bankruptcy estate sued NNIC under Louisiana law 
 
 138 Id. at 314–16. 
 139 Id. at 314. 
 140 Id. at 315 (noting that this state law analysis would be “highly localized, specialized, judgmental, and 
perhaps partisan”). 
 141 Id. (quoting New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. 491 U.S. at 365) 
 142 Id. at 315–16. 
 143 Id. at 316. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Lentz, 730 F. Supp. 2d 567. 
 146 Id. at 571. 
 147 Id. 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. at 571–72. 
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citing alleged violations of NNIC’s duty of good faith and fair dealing to 
Hale.150 
The case remained unresolved as of 2009 when NNIC entered into 
insolvency proceedings in Wisconsin.151 Several new defendants, referred to as 
the “AK defendants,” were also added to the case.152 The Hale estate’s trustee 
amended the complaint to claim that NNIC and the AK defendants were 
merely “all alter egos of each other” and are all liable for damages against 
Hale.153 Hale’s estate also sought to annul a transfer of funds pursuant to the 
order of a Wisconsin state court between NNIC and one of the AK 
defendants.154 The AK defendants filed motions to dismiss the plaintiff’s 
complaints and, alternatively, to stay plaintiff’s claims pending the resolution 
of NNIC’s state court rehabilitation proceedings with ADIC in Wisconsin.155 
The Louisiana Eastern District Court denied NNIC’s motions to dismiss 
and instead opted to analyze the issue under the Burford abstention doctrine.156 
The court determined not to abstain under Burford through application of the 
Wilson factors.157 The court found the first factor to favor Burford abstention 
on the ground that the case involved only issues of Wisconsin state law.158 
However, the second factor weighed against Burford abstention because NNIC 
failed to demonstrate that the case involved any unsettled issue of state law.159 
Third, as to the importance of the state interest involved, the court determined 
that while an important and complex state administrative scheme existed, it 
would not be frustrated by the resolution of this case.160  
Additionally, the court found the fourth factor to also weigh against 
invocation of the Burford doctrine because hearing the case would not disrupt 
the state’s goal of a implementing a coherent policy for the regulation of 
 
 150 Id. at 572. 
 151 Id. 
 152 Id. at 571–72 (describing the “AK defendants” as “Armco Insurance Group, Inc., Armco Financial 
Services Corporation, AFSG Holdings Company, Inc., AKS Investments, Inc., and AK Steel Corporation”). 
 153 Id. at 572. 
 154 Id. at 573. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Id. at 585 (“Accordingly, NNIC’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion and the AK defendants’ Rule 12(b)(1) 
motion are DENIED. Such concerns are better addressed through an analysis of the Burford abstention 
doctrine.”). 
 157 Id. at 587–91; see Wilson, 8 F.3d at 314–16. 
 158 Lentz, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 587. 
 159 Id. 
 160 Id. at 588. 
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insolvent insurers.161 Notably, the court held that the plaintiff was not 
attempting to “leapfrog ahead” of other claimants stopped by the state 
equivalent of an automatic stay and was merely creating one additional claim 
against an insolvent insurance company.162 Finally, the court noted that the 
state had a special forum for judicial review in place, favoring abstention.163 
Based on this analysis, the court decided not to abstain on Burford grounds. 
The court decided not to abstain because, even though courts in this context 
often abstain on Burford grounds, adjudication of this particular case would 
not substantially interfere with the administration of NNIC’s assets by 
Wisconsin state authorities through its insolvency proceedings.164 
2. The Grimes Factors 
The second formulation bears some similarities to the Wilson test, but also 
directly addresses the significance of state control over insurance regulation. 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit developed a four-part approach for 
determining when to invoke Burford abstention in Grimes v. Crown Life 
Insurance Co. that looks at:  
Whether (1) the suit is based on a cause of action which is entirely 
federal, (2) the suit requires the court to determine issues which are 
directly relevant to the liquidation proceeding or state policy in the 
regulation of the insurance industry, (3) state procedures indicate a 
desire to create special state forums to regulate and adjudicate these 
issues, and (4) difficult or unusual state laws are at issue. 165 
In Grimes, Gerald Grimes, the Oklahoma Insurance Commissioner, acted 
as the liquidator of the United Equity Life Insurance Company (UELIC) to 
realize an agreement between UELIC and Crown Life Insurance Company.166 
The agreement allowed UELIC to transfer some of its insurance liability to 
Crown Life Insurance Company, and the case hinged on the agreement’s 
meaning and legality.167 After the lower court sided with Crown Life Insurance 
Company, Gerald appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals on the 
grounds that the court lacked jurisdiction and, if it had jurisdiction, should 
 
 161 Id. at 589. 
 162 Id. at 590. 
 163 Id. 
 164 Id. at 590–91. 
 165 Grimes, 857 F.2d at 704–05 (internal citations omitted) (abrogated in part by statute on grounds 
unrelated to Burford in 36 Okl. St. § 1928 (2016)). 
 166 Id. at 700. 
 167 Id. at 700–01. 
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have abstained.168 After dismissing the jurisdiction argument, the Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit approached the issue from the perspective of 
abstention.169 The court held Burford to be the most potentially applicable 
abstention doctrine.170 
The court noted the McCarran-Ferguson Act and a traditional deference 
provided to state receivership proceedings before formulating the set of factors 
for determining whether to invoke Burford abstention.171 Citing a variety of 
federal decisions, 172 the court decided to determine the Burford issue based on 
(1) whether the suit derives from a federal cause of action, (2) whether the suit 
requires the court to determine issues directly relevant to state insurance 
liquidation proceedings or regulations, (3) whether the state procedures 
indicate a desire to create special state forums to regulate and adjudicate, and 
(4) whether difficult or unusual questions of state law are at issue.173 
After evaluating the facts based on the four factors, the court held that the 
claim was not grounded in any federal cause of action, the facts strongly 
related to state regulation of state insolvency proceedings, Oklahoma had 
designated a forum to oversee the proceedings, and complex state laws and 
regulations were central to resolving the dispute.174 Thus, the court invoked 
Burford abstention and remanded the case to the designated state court.175  
D. A Uniform Set of Factors 
The factors for determining the application of Burford abstention 
developed by the Tenth Circuit in Grimes present an ideal foundation for 
navigating the post-NOPSI, post-Quackenbush framework. Tellingly, federal 
courts in cases involving a party undergoing an insurance insolvency 
proceeding have cited this approach positively and applied it.176  
 
 168 Id. at 701. 
 169 Id. at 703. 
 170 Id. 
 171 Id. at 703–04. 
 172 See, e.g., United Servs. Auto. Asso. v. Muir, 792 F.2d 356 (3rd Cir. 1986); Board of Educ. v. 
Bosworth, 713 F.2d 1316 (7th Cir. 1983). 
 173 Grimes, 857 F.2d at 704–05. 
 174 Id. at 705. 
 175 Id. at 706–07. 
 176 See Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 913 F.2d 419, 425–26 (7th Cir. 1990); Barnhardt 
Marine Ins., Inc. v. New England Int’l Sur., Inc., 961 F.2d 529, 254 (5th Cir. 1992) (discussing the court’s 
reasoning in Grimes); see also Overflow Energy, L.L.C. v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of the Cty. of Roger Mills, 
No. CIV-13-1136-HE, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12860, at *5–6 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 3, 2014) (“Although, as noted 
below, there is some basis for concluding Grimes may have viewed Burford abstention too broadly, it 
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However, courts continue to dispute the appropriateness of Burford 
abstention in crucial areas not addressed by the Tenth Circuit in Grimes.177 
Thus, a need for clarification in evaluating the relevance of the Burford 
abstention doctrine necessitates a broader set of factors that encompasses these 
additional concerns. This Comment proposes that courts considering Burford 
abstention adopt a set of factors that address both the policy considerations 
behind Burford abstention and the exclusion of insurance companies from the 
Code while still functioning within the parameters set by bankruptcy law, the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act, and legal precedent. 
The proposed factors (the first four of which draw from the formulation 
developed by the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Grimes)178 are as 
follows: (1) whether the cause of action is entirely federal; (2) whether the 
resolution of the suit requires the court to interfere with state policies related to 
insurance insolvency proceedings; (3) whether state policies or procedures 
designate a particular state forum for the regulation and adjudication of issues 
central to the litigation; (4) whether difficult or unusual state laws are at issue; 
(5) whether the court is sitting in equity; and (6) whether the state that would 
hear a remanded case has a direct interest in the specific outcome of the 
litigation in a case brought to a federal court through diversity jurisdiction. 
This section will examine these factors in light of the policy considerations 
behind the McCarran-Ferguson Act and Congress’ exclusion of insurance 
companies from the Code, the text of the Code and the McCarran-Ferguson 
Act, and the policy considerations that led to the development of the Burford 
abstention doctrine. Finally, the proposed factors will be illustrated by 
applying them to a hypothetical, and then concerns that they may favor 
Burford abstention excessively will be addressed. 
 
continues to provide useful guidance as to factors to be weighed.”). But see Melahn v. Pennock Insurance, Inc. 
965 F.2d 1497, 1507 (8th Cir. 1992) (“The district court’s reliance on the holding in Grimes is misplaced 
because Grimes was based mainly on Second Circuit authority which ‘adopted a broad view of abstention’. . 
.NOPSI does not permit a broad view of abstention.”) (quoting Smith v. Metropolitan Prop. & Liability Ins. 
Co., 629 F.2d 757, 760 (2nd Cir. 1980)). 
 177 Compare Wolfson, 51 F.3d at 147 (Burford abstention appropriate in a damages action), with 
University of Md., 923 F.2d at 272 (citing New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 491 U.S. 350) (NOPSI limits the 
application of Burford abstention when the court is not sitting in equity). 
 178 Grimes, 857 F.2d at 704–05. 
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1. The Policy Considerations Behind the McCarran-Ferguson Act and the 
Exclusion of Insurance Companies from the Code 
The McCarran-Ferguson Act clearly expresses the intent of Congress to 
leave regulations regarding “the business of insurance” to the states.179 
Congress’s motivation in passing the McCarran-Ferguson Act appears to be 
that Congress did not want to interfere with states that were better-equipped to 
handle the localized nature of much of the insurance industry because they had 
appropriate regulatory systems in place already.180 The Code (somewhat 
confusingly) conveys the same policy by closing all avenues of filing for 
bankruptcy off to insurance companies.181 While some commentators have 
found the justifications that spurred the passage of the McCarran-Ferguson Act 
to be outdated,182 the goal of keeping the business of insurance insolvency with 
the states remains embodied by standing law.183 The proposed factors fall in 
line with these goals. The proposed factors not only address the need to avoid 
unwarranted federal intrusion on cases involving unusual issues of state law 
that could be resolved in a designated state forum (the Wilson factors 
essentially do the same), but also specifically designate the presence of state 
insurance regulation and insolvency proceedings as favoring abstention.184 
2. The Text of the Code and the McCarran-Ferguson Act 
Policy arguments aside, the text of the standing law regarding insurance 
insolvency proceedings favors the relatively broad parameters on Burford 
abstention set by the proposed formulation. The McCarran-Ferguson Act 
declares that “the continued regulation and taxation by the several States of the 
business of insurance is in the public interest.”185 The Code simply excludes 
 
 179 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (2012). 
 180 See Darr, supra note 34, at 607. 
 181 See generally 11 U.S.C. § 109 (2012). 
 182 See Rice, supra note 8, at 404–07 (describing arguments for and against the repeal of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act); see also Hon. Samuel L. Bufford, Suggestion For The National Bankruptcy Review 
Commission And Congress: Increasing Scope Of Bankruptcy Code, 4 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 500 (1996) 
(“I think that the most important systemic defect in the present United States bankruptcy system is that it 
excludes the insolvencies of insurance companies, banks and other financial institutions. I would recommend 
that the Bankruptcy Review Commission propose that the Bankruptcy Code be expanded to include these 
institutions.”). 
 183 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (2012); see also Employee Retirement Income Security Program, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1144(b)(2) (2012) (excluding pre-emption provisions from applying to laws regulating the business of 
insurance). 
 184 See Grimes, 857 F.2d at 704–05. 
 185  See 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (2012); see generally 11 U.S.C. § 109 (2012). 
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insurance companies from filing for bankruptcy under federal law.186 The fact 
that states are the only remaining entities capable of handling the liquidation 
and insolvency procedures of insurance companies reinforces the significance 
of preventing unwarranted federal intrusion into these processes. Thus, 
criticisms levied against courts using formulations that grant relatively broad 
purview to Burford abstention187 are misguided, as the text of current 
bankruptcy law favors abstention in appropriate circumstances. If Congress 
finds federal courts to be invoking Burford abstention too often, then Congress 
can certainly repeal the McCarran-Ferguson Act or amend the Code.  
3. The Future of the McCarran-Ferguson Act 
The House of Representatives has made two efforts in recent years to 
repeal the McCarran-Ferguson Act.188 The first passed in 2010 by a vote of 
406 in favor and 19 against.189 However, it was never voted on in the Senate. 
The second passed in 2017 by a vote of 416 in favor and 7 against.190 The 
Senate could conceivably vote on a similar repeal during the current legislative 
session, and President Donald J. Trump has indicated that he would sign such a 
repeal into law.191 
The repeal bill passed by the House of Representatives has the stated 
purpose “[t]o restore the application of the Federal antitrust laws to the 
business of health insurance to protect competition and consumers.”192 The bill 
functions to modify the McCarran-Ferguson act such that “[n]othing contained 
in this Act shall modify, impair, or supersede the operation of any of the 
antitrust laws with respect to the business of health insurance . . . .”193 Notably, 
the bill applies the repeal to dental insurance but not to life insurance, property 
insurance, or casualty insurance. Thus, if the bill passed into law, only health 
 
 186 See 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (2012); see generally 11 U.S.C. § 109 (2012). 
 187 See Overflow Energy, L.L.C., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12860, at *5–6; cf. Melahn, 965 F.2d at 1507. 
 188 See Health Insurance Industry Fair Competition Act of 2017, H.R. 617, 115th Cong. (2017); 
Competitive Health Insurance Reform Act Of 2017, H.R. 372, 115th Cong. (2017). 
 189 See H.R. 617, 115th Cong. (“The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were-yeas 406, nays 
19, not voting 8”). 
 190 See Jennifer Webb, House Passes McCarran-Ferguson Repeal Bill, INDEP. AGENT MAG. (Mar. 23, 
2017), http://www.iamagazine.com/news/read/2017/03/23/house-passes-mccarran-ferguson-repeal-bill. 
 191 See Donald J. Trump, Healthcare Reform (Mar. 3, 2016), https://assets.donaldjtrump.com/ 
HCReformPaper.pdf (stating as one of seven goals “Modify existing law that inhibits the sale of health 
insurance across state lines.”). 
 192 H.R. 372, 115th Cong.  
 193 Id. 
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insurance and dental insurance would be affected. All other forms of insurance 
would not be affected. 
This repeal, if passed, would have only a negligible effect on the proposed 
factors test. If the repeal bill goes into law, then the McCarran-Ferguson Act 
would cease to support one factor (the second) in the proposed formula for 
applying the Burford abstention doctrine only in cases involving the 
insolvencies of health and dental insurance companies. Note, however, that 
policy concerns and the exclusion of insurance companies from the Code 
would still continue to support Burford abstention in cases involving all 
insurance companies undergoing state insolvency proceedings. 
4. The Policy Considerations Behind Burford Abstention: Considering 
Each Factor in the Proposed Test 
In this section, each factor in the proposed test will be examined and its 
relevance explained. 
a. Whether the Suit is Based on an Entirely Federal Cause of Action 
The Supreme Court in Burford v. Sun Oil sought to prevent a court from 
exercising its jurisdiction in a way that would interfere with complex state 
administrative procedures.194 The Court expressed concern over a federal court 
second-guessing the decisions made by a specialized state administrative body 
on matters grounded in state policy.195 The first proposed factor, whether the 
suit is based on an entirely federal cause of action, effectively addresses these 
policy concerns.196 Under this formula, a case grounded in state law favors 
abstention, whereas a case grounded in federal law disfavors abstention.197 By 
weighing the presence of federal issues in the cause of action (for example, 
federal question subject matter jurisdiction) the first factor satisfies the goal 
from Burford v. Sun Oil of avoiding undue interference with state policies.198 
 
 194 Burford, 319 U.S. at 332–34. 
 195 Id. at 332 (“These questions of regulation of the industry by the state administrative agency, whether 
involving gas or oil prorationing programs or Rule 37 cases, so clearly involves basic problems of Texas 
policy that equitable discretion should be exercised to give the Texas courts the first opportunity to consider 
them.”). 
 196 Grimes, 857 F.2d at 704–05. 
 197 See Overflow Energy, L.L.C., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12860, *5–6 (holding that the centrality of 
state law issues to the case favors Burford abstention under the Grimes formula). 
 198 See Burford, 319 U.S. at 332. 
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By contrast, the first factor from the Wilson formula, whether the cause of 
action arises under federal or state law, narrows the reach of Burford too 
excessively when taking into account the Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit’s interpretation of NOPSI.199 The policy goals from Burford v. Sun Oil 
are better fulfilled by examining if the cause of action arises entirely under 
federal law, because the avoidance of federal intrusion on a complex state 
policy goal through Burford abstention could potentially be merited in any case 
with a cause of action that is not entirely federal. Burford abstention may be an 
“extraordinary and narrow”200 exception to a federal court’s constitutional duty 
to hear certain cases,201 but it should remain an option so long as the cause of 
action is not entirely federal. 
b. Whether the Resolution of the Suit Requires the Court to Interfere with 
State Policies Related to Insurance Insolvency Proceedings202 
The second proposed factor, whether the resolution of the suit requires the 
court to interfere with state policies related to insurance insolvency 
proceedings, is central to its success in following the policy goals behind 
Burford abstention.203 As courts have noted,204 Burford abstention was 
designed to avoid federal interference with precisely the kind of complex state 
policy goals that the regulation of insurance companies and their insolvencies 
represents.205 A state’s regulation of insurance companies and their insolvency 
proceedings is a long-reaching and important administrative task over an 
industry that, since 2011, has experienced annual revenue of over $1.2 
trillion.206  
 
 199 Wilson, 8 F.3d at 314 (applying NOPSI). 
 200 Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 728 (quoting Colorado River Water Conservation Dist., 424 U.S. at 813) 
(quoting County of Allegheny, 360 U.S. at 188–89); see also Wolfson, 51 F.3d at 147 (noting “the strong 
presumption in favor of exercising federal jurisdiction”). 
 201 See Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19, 40 (1909) (“When a Federal court is properly 
appealed to in a case over which it has by law jurisdiction, it is its duty to take such jurisdiction.”) (citation 
omitted). 
 202 If the bill partially repealing the McCarran-Ferguson Act that has passed in the House is also passed 
in the Senate and ultimately becomes law, then this factor will be modified to more strongly favor abstention 
in cases involving insolvent property, life, and casualty insurance companies than cases involving insolvent 
health and dental insurance companies. See H.R. 372, 115th Cong. 
 203 Grimes, 857 F.2d at 704–05. 
 204 See Callon Petroleum Co., 351 F.3d at 209. 
 205 See Clark, 105 F.3d at 1052 (“permitting the Texas plaintiffs to proceed in federal court would 
undermine the comprehensive apparatus established by the state of Arizona for the orderly disposition of 
claims against insolvent insurance companies.”). See generally Knoerzer, supra note 86. 
 206 See Sean Millard, An investor’s guide to the insurance business, MARKET REALIST (Feb. 11, 2015, 
5:07 PM), http://marketrealist.com/2015/02/us-insurance-industry-largest-world/. 
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With its goal of avoiding undue federal influence in complex state 
administrative schemes, Burford abstention is appropriate in cases that might 
disrupt a state’s efforts to regulate insurance companies.207 Unlike the Wilson 
factors, the proposed formulation specifically references avoiding interference 
with state insurance insolvency regulations in an accurate reflection of the 
strong power given to the States in this area.208 
c. Whether State Policies or Procedures Designate a Particular State 
Forum for the Regulation and Adjudication of Issues Central to the 
Litigation 
The third proposed factor, whether state policies or procedures designate a 
particular state forum for the regulation and adjudication of issues central to 
the litigation, reflects a central tenet of the Court’s decision in Burford v. Sun 
Oil.209 The Court sought to give “Texas courts the first opportunity to 
consider” the regulatory questions before it, demonstrating a preference for the 
matter to be decided in an appropriate state forum.210 Furthermore, the Court 
described how the Texas legislature had “established a system of thorough 
judicial review by its own state courts” of orders issued by the Texas Railroad 
Commission.211 The third proposed factor thus follows the Burford doctrine’s 
goals by favoring abstention when a state forum exists to hear the matter, 
especially when the procedures indicate the state’s desire for the matter to be 
heard in that forum.212 Although the fifth criteria of the Wilson formula, “the 
presence of a special state forum for judicial review,” parallels this goal, it 
does so on general terms. Those general terms fail to address the Burford 
Court’s reliance on the fact that Texas had established a specific system for 
reviewing the Commission’s decisions in its state courts.213 
 
 207 See Knoerzer, supra note 86, at 840 (“Because it expressly contemplates an ongoing state proceeding 
implicating important state regulatory issues, the Burford doctrine is particularly well-suited for consideration 
of whether to abstain in favor of state rehabilitation or liquidation proceedings.”). 
 208 Compare Grimes, 857 F.2d at 704–05, with Wilson, 8 F.3d at 314–16. 
 209 Burford, 319 U.S. 315. 
 210 Id. at 332. 
 211 Id. at 325. 
 212 See Grimes, 857 F.2d at 704–05. 
 213 Wilson, 8 F.3d at 314–17; Burford, 319 U.S. at 325. 
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d. Whether Difficult or Unusual State Laws Are at Issue 
The fourth proposed factor, whether difficult or unusual state laws are at 
issue, ties into the initial facts of Burford v. Sun Oil.214 In Burford, a crucial 
element of the Court’s reasoning was the presence of an extremely complex set 
of state laws and issues.215 The Texas Railroad Commission issued an order 
based off its analysis of a forty-mile-long oil field in which over 26,000 wells 
had been drilled.216 This order was part of a regulatory scheme meant to 
manage Texas’s massive oil industry.217 Moreover, the Texas Railroad 
Commission came into existence under a statute passed “for the protection of 
public and private interests against such evils by prohibiting waste and 
compelling ratable production.”218 As the Court held, “These questions of 
regulation of the industry by the state administrative agency, whether involving 
gas or oil prorationing programs or Rule 37 cases, so clearly involves basic 
problems of Texas policy that equitable discretion should be exercised to give 
the Texas courts the first opportunity to consider them.”219 The proposed 
formula adequately incorporates this concern by favoring abstention in cases 
that involve “difficult or unusual state laws.”220 A clear sign that this factor 
should be applied to favor Burford abstention is the involvement of a state 
administrative agency well-equipped to carry out a complex task of 
importance.221 
e. Whether the Court is Sitting in Equity 
Ever since the Supreme Court established Burford abstention in the context 
of an equity proceeding,222 courts have debated whether or not to apply it in a 
 
 214 Burford, 319 U.S. 315. 
 215 Id. at 318–19. 
 216 Id. 
 217 Id. at 319–20. 
 218 Id. at 320. 
 219 Id. at 332; see also Ohio Valley Envt’l Coalition v. River Cities Disposal, LLC, No. 15-47-DLB-
EBA, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40791, at *24 n.12 (E.D. Ky Mar. 29, 2016) (invoking Burford abstention where 
“[n]ot only would federal review at this juncture be disruptive of Kentucky’s efforts to establish a coherent 
policy with respect to solid waste facilities and air quality standards, but the resolution of OVEC’s claims are 
likely to involve difficult questions of state law.”). 
 220 Grimes, 857 F.2d at 704–05. 
 221 See generally Burford, 319 U.S. 315. See also Sierra Club v. Chesapeake Operating, LLC, No. CIV-
134-F, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90913, at *31 (W.D. Okla. April 4, 2017) (invoking Burford abstention where 
“it is plain that the Oklahoma Corporation Commission has brought to bear a level of technical expertise that 
this court could not hope to match.”). 
 222 Burford, 319 U.S. at 334 (“sound respect for the independence of state action requires the federal 
equity court to stay its hand.”). 
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damages action.223 Most notably, the Supreme Court in Quackenbush held that 
a court can only stay a case on Burford grounds in a damages action, but the 
court can also dismiss or remand if it is sitting in equity.224 Elsewhere, courts 
have generally held that the fact that a court is sitting in equity favors Burford 
abstention,225 but courts have reached different conclusions regarding the 
extent to which the presence of a damages action forecloses Burford abstention 
as a possibility.226  
A bright-line rule on the significance of whether a court is sitting in equity 
defies the relevant case law and legal precedent, as illustrated by the detailed 
analysis of the complexities of the administrative tasks of the Texas Railroad 
Commission in Burford v. Sun Oil.227 Instead, the proposed factor of whether 
the court is sitting in equity, with an equity action favoring abstention and a 
different type of action disfavoring abstention, clearly follows the policy goals 
behind the Burford doctrine. As the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in 
Wolfson v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. noted: 
We think it unwise to make rigid distinctions between legal and 
equitable claims in the merged federal system, particularly for claims 
such as those under ERISA whose historical antecedents are unclear . 
. . . No doubt abstention is less apt to be appropriate when the federal 
plaintiff seeks money damages, but we do not read the Supreme 
Court’s abstention jurisprudence as completely foreclosing 
abstention in money damage cases.228 
Both the Wilson and Grimes formulations fail to include an examination of 
whether a court is sitting in equity in determining the applicability of Burford 
abstention.229 The centrality of the equitable nature of the relief sought in 
 
 223 See supra Section I, Subsection D. 
 224 Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 721; see also Feige v. Sechrest, 90 F.3d 846, 850–51 (3rd Cir. 1996) (a 
court may stay, but not dismiss or remand, a damages action on Burford grounds). 
 225 See, e.g., University of Md., 923 F.2d at 272 (rejecting an argument that Burford abstention is equally 
applicable at law or in equity). 
 226 Compare Wolfson, 51 F.3d at 147 (“No doubt abstention is less apt to be appropriate when the 
federal plaintiff seeks money damages, but we do not read the Supreme Court’s abstention jurisprudence as 
completely foreclosing abstention in money damage cases.”), with Fragoso, 991 F. 2d at 882 (Burford 
abstention inappropriate in a torts action), and Garamendi v. Allstate Ins. Co., 47 F.3d 350, 356 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(“a district court may not abstain under Burford when the plaintiff seeks only legal relief”). 
 227 Burford, 319 U.S. at 339–41; see Wolfson, 51 F.3d at 145 (“Abstention is inherently a fact-specific 
inquiry.”). 
 228 Wolfson, 51 F.3d at 147 (citations omitted). 
 229 See Wilson, 8 F.3d at 313–15; Grimes, 857 F.2d at 704–05. 
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Burford v. Sun Oil illustrates the significance of this omission.230 In the 
Supreme Court’s re-examination of the doctrine in Quackenbush, the ruling 
emphasized the applicability of Buford abstention to suits of equitable and non-
equitable natures while clarifying that “while we have held that federal courts 
may stay actions for damages based on abstention principles, we have not held 
that those principles support the outright dismissal or remand of damages 
actions.”231 This distinction, and the preference it embodies for the application 
of Burford abstention in equitable actions (while limiting, but not eliminating, 
its application in damages actions) necessitates the consideration of the nature 
of the case in an ideal Burford formulation. More broadly, the unique, 
discretionary powers of a court of equity support the relevance of concerns for 
public policy embodied by the Burford abstention doctrine’s goal of avoiding 
interference with a complex state administrative scheme.232 By contrast, 
judicial discretion to renounce jurisdiction has less support in the context of 
actions at law.233 
f. Whether the State that Would Hear a Remanded Case Has a Direct 
Interest in the Specific Outcome of the Litigation in an Action Brought 
to a Federal Court through Diversity Jurisdiction 
The sixth proposed factor, whether the state that would hear a remanded 
case has a direct interest in the specific outcome of the litigation in an action 
brought to a federal court through diversity jurisdiction, addresses an easily-
overlooked consequence of a remand resulting from a court invoking Burford 
abstention in the context of diversity jurisdiction. Diversity jurisdiction 
originated from Article III of the Constitution’s grant of federal judicial power 
to cases “between Citizens of different States.”234 Among the most-cited 
justifications for the existence of diversity jurisdiction is a fear of bias against 
out-of-state litigants from state court judges and juries.235 These concerns 
underlie one facet of why the doctrine of abstention constitutes only “an 
extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty of a District Court to adjudicate 
 
 230 Burford, 319 U.S. at 334 (“a sound respect for the independence of state action requires the federal 
equity court to stay its hand”). 
 231 Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 721. 
 232 See generally Garamendi, 47 F.3d at 354–56. 
 233 See Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass’n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 120–21 (1981) (“There is little 
room for the ‘principle of comity’ in actions at law where, apart from matters of administration, judicial 
discretion is at a minimum.”) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 234 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 235 James M. Underwood, The Late, Great Diversity Jurisdiction, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 182 
(2006). 
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a controversy properly before it.”236 And these concerns manifest themselves 
in a remanded action where the state that will hear the case has a strong interest 
in its outcome, as a state judge or jury may be biased (or at least may create the 
appearance of bias) as a result.237 
For example, in Baltimore Bank for Cooperatives v. Farmer’s Cheese 
Cooperative, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit noted the intervention 
as a party defendant of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in a case brought 
through diversity jurisdiction that, if remanded on Burford grounds, it would 
be heard in Pennsylvania.238 The court held that this weakened the argument 
for abstention.239 The presence of the state as a defendant in a case with an out-
of-state plaintiff raised the same set of concerns that were behind the inception 
of diversity jurisdiction, thus leading the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
to reject Burford abstention in favor of hearing the case in a federal forum.240 
The proposed formula adopts a factor that addresses these considerations such 
that the presence of a state that (A) has an interest in the specific outcome of 
the litigation that may create bias or the appearance of bias and (B) would also 
hear a remanded case disfavors Burford abstention. 
A state’s interest in the specific outcome of litigation as described by this 
factor should be differentiated from a state’s broad interest in achieving policy 
goals through a complex state administrative scheme. Central to Burford 
abstention is an overriding goal of avoiding the disruption of a state’s 
administrative efforts to achieve a goal of public importance, and the presence 
of such a potential disruption certainly favors invoking Burford abstention. By 
contrast, a state’s clear and immediate interest in the outcome of a specific case 
favorable to a particular party does not elicit the same policy concerns. 
5. Applying the Factors—A Hypothetical 
a. The Facts  
A hypothetical lawsuit involving one party arguing in favor of Burford 
abstention can help to illustrate the proper application, as well as the utility, of 
the factors proposed here. In this scenario, Live-Long Life Insurance Company 
is undergoing an insolvency proceeding in its state of incorporation, Maine. 
 
 236 County of Allegheny, 360 U.S. at 188. 
 237 See Baltimore Bank for Coops., 583 F.2d 104.  
 238 Id. at 111–13. 
 239 Id. 
 240 Id. 
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Live-Long is also the fourth-largest employer in Maine, employing thousands 
of citizens whose job prospects are jeopardized by the insolvency. An ad 
company, Stanley Hooper, files a lawsuit against Live-Long a year after Live-
Long’s insolvency proceedings began. The lawsuit seeks $1,000,000 for 
contract damages or, in the alternative (if the court finds no contract exists), 
unjust enrichment.241 Stanley Hooper is based in Delaware and files the lawsuit 
in federal court, claiming diversity jurisdiction on the grounds that the parties 
are incorporated in different states and the amount sought exceeds $75,000.242 
After Stanley Hooper files the lawsuit, Live-Long argues that the court should 
abstain from hearing the case on Burford grounds. 
b. Applying The Proposed Factors 
The federal court would then examine the facts of the case in light of the 
six factors presented here: (1) whether the cause of action is entirely federal, 
(2) whether the resolution of the suit requires the court to interfere with state 
policies related to insurance insolvency proceedings, (3) whether state policies 
or procedures designate a particular state forum for the regulation and 
adjudication of issues central to the litigation, (4) whether difficult or unusual 
state laws are at issue, (5) whether the court is sitting in equity, and (6) whether 
the state that would hear a remanded case has a direct interest in the specific 
outcome of the litigation brought to a federal court through diversity 
jurisdiction. 
c. Whether the Cause of Action is Entirely Federal 
The first factor, whether the cause of action is entirely federal, supports 
abstention on these facts. Had the issue been brought to the federal court under 
federal question jurisdiction or partially on the basis of the application of a 
federal law, the case for Burford abstention would be weakened. Here, 
however, Stanley Hooper’s damages claim derives from contract law, which is 
 
 241 See June Roberts Agency v. Venture Props., 676 A.2d 46, 49 n.1 (Me. 1996) (explaining that while 
the existence of a contract precludes recovery on a theory of unjust enrichment, a party “is not precluded from 
pleading both theories because a factfinder may find that no contract exists and may still award damages on 
the theory of unjust enrichment.”). See generally Evergreen W. Bus. Ctr., LLC v. Emmert, 323 P.3d 250 
(2014) (discussing, under an Oregon state statute, the validity of alternative legal claims for damages and 
equitable relief). 
 242 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012). 
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governed by states. Further, Stanley Hooper’s alternative claim for unjust 
enrichment is not entirely grounded in federal law.243 
d. Whether the Resolution of the Suit Requires the Court to Interfere with 
State Policies Related to Insurance Insolvency Proceedings 
The second factor, whether the resolution of the suit requires the court to 
interfere with state policies related to insurance insolvency proceedings, 
weighs in favor of abstention. The amount of the claim, $1,000,000, is high 
enough that a verdict for the plaintiff could potentially disrupt Maine’s efforts 
to manage Live-Long’s insolvency. Policyholders seeking payment, and 
creditors of Live-Long, may have the distribution of funds to them from Live-
Long’s estate interrupted and lessened as a result. The state equivalent of an 
automatic stay, which would serve to protect the estate of Live-Long Insurance 
Company,244 would be impeded by a ruling in federal court against it.  
Crucially, a court could plausibly determine that Stanley Hooper is 
attempting to “leapfrog ahead” of other creditors, given that Stanley Hooper 
filed the lawsuit after the insurance insolvency proceedings began.245 Courts 
have expressed concerns that allowing such cases to proceed can create a “race 
to the courthouse” that encourages claimants and creditors to sue insolvent 
insurance companies in federal courts.246 By contrast, had Stanley Hooper filed 
before the insolvency proceedings began or seemed imminent, no attempt to 
“leapfrog ahead” of other claimants would be necessary. 
e. Whether State Policies or Procedures Designate a Particular State 
Forum for the Regulation and Adjudication of Issues Central to the 
Litigation 
The third factor, whether state policies or procedures designate a particular 
state forum for the regulation and adjudication of issues central to the 
litigation, depends on the state policies and procedures. In Lentz v. Trinchard, 
the Louisiana Eastern District Court applied a similar factor from Wilson to 
 
 243 See, e.g., June Roberts Agency, 676 A.2d at 49 n.1 (evaluating an unjust enrichment claim in a state 
court). 
 244 See Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 24-A, ch. 57, § 4449 (2017) (describing a stay of all proceedings against 
a delinquent insurer). 
 245 See Lentz, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 589–90; Clark v. Underwriters Mgmt. Corp., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
8378, at *21–22 (N.D. Ill. 2003). 
 246 See Lentz, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 589–90; Underwriters Mgmt. Corp., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8378, at 
*21–22. 
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hold that the presence of a local circuit court as a rehabilitation court fulfilled 
this factor, favoring abstention.247 Here, Maine’s Insurance Code gives original 
jurisdiction over delinquency proceedings to the Maine Superior Court and 
designates that venue shall be appropriate in a state court in the county of the 
insurer’s principal place of business.248 Thus, under Maine law, the applicable 
state court for delinquency proceedings would likely also serve as a venue for 
addressing the case within the context of the relevant codes for insurance 
insolvency proceedings. The presence of a state forum for adjudication of the 
issue thus functions to support abstention. 
f. Whether Difficult or Unusual State Laws Are at Issue 
The fourth factor, whether difficult or unusual state laws are at issue, 
disfavors abstention. No difficult or unusual state law appears to exist, unless 
the relevant contract provisions are atypically perplexing.249 Additionally, 
Maine has also established three clear factors to use when evaluating the 
alternative claim of unjust enrichment.250 
g. Whether the Court Is Sitting in Equity 
The fifth factor, whether the court is sitting in equity, neither favors nor 
disfavors abstention. On the one hand, Stanley Hooper’s first claim is for 
damages, a legal remedy. However, Stanley Hooper’s alternative claim is for 
unjust enrichment, an equitable remedy. Therefore, this factor neither supports 
nor weakens the case for Burford abstention on its face.251 
 
 247 Lentz, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 590. 
 248 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 24-A, ch. 57, § 4354 (2017) (note that venue for an insurance company with 
its principal place of business in another state is selected differently). 
 249 Reducing the potential complexity of the contract law is the fact that Maine has adopted all but one 
article of the Uniform Commercial Code. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 11, §§ 1-101–10-108 (2017). 
 250 See ERA-Northern Assocs. v. Border Tr. Co., 662 A.2d 243, 245 (Me. 1995) (describing three factors 
for determining whether an activity conferred an unjust enrichment on a party: (1) it conferred a benefit on the 
party, (2) the party had appreciation or knowledge of the benefit, and (3) the party’s acceptance or retention of 
the benefit was under such circumstances as to make it inequitable for the party to retain the benefit without 
payment of its value). 
 251 The comparative plausibility of the two alternative claims could be relevant here. If a contract clearly 
existed, then this factor would disfavor abstention. If a contract almost certainly did not exist, then the 
equitable remedy of unjust enrichment would play a central role in the case, favoring abstention. 
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h. Whether the State that Would Hear a Remanded Case Has a Direct 
Interest in the Specific Outcome of the Litigation in an Action Brought 
to a Federal Court through Diversity Jurisdiction 
The sixth factor, whether the state that would hear a remanded case 
initially brought to federal court through diversity jurisdiction has a direct 
interest in the case’s outcome, disfavors abstention due to the specific facts of 
the hypothetical. The goal of avoiding potential bias in a state court proceeding 
against an out-of-state party, that serves as a foundation for diversity 
jurisdiction, applies here. Stanley Hooper could justifiably fear bias from a 
state judge or state jury in a lawsuit in a Maine state court. An out-of-state 
plaintiff suing one of Maine’s leading employers will be precariously 
positioned while undergoing an insolvency proceeding. Since Maine has an 
interest in an outcome favoring Live-Long Insurance, this last factor weakens 
the case for abstention. 
i. Conclusion of the Hypothetical Analysis 
A court would consider these six factors in light of the “extraordinary and 
narrow exception” language used in Quackenbush to characterize Burford 
abstention.252 Here, the fourth factor disfavors abstention due to the lack of any 
difficult or unusual state laws in the case, and the sixth factor disfavors 
abstention due to the state interest in the specific outcome. The first, second, 
and third factors support abstention due the lack of grounding of the causes of 
action in federal law, the resolution of the case potentially interfering with state 
policies related to insurance insolvency proceedings, and the presence of a 
state forum for adjudicating the dispute.  
Overall, Burford abstention would be justified in this case. Since the 
presence of complex state policies related to oil well drilling was central the 
Supreme Court’s reasoning in Burford v. Sun Oil,253 the lack of complex state 
laws in this hypothetical case would normally cause a court to refuse to invoke 
Burford abstention. However, the large scale of the disruption to a state’s 
efforts to regulate the business of insurance, that would be brought about by a 
potential $1,000,000 verdict against a party undergoing an insurance 
 
 252 Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 728 (quoting Colorado River Water Conservation Dist., 424 U.S. at 813) 
(quoting County of Allegheny, 360 U.S. at 188–89). 
 253 Burford, 319 U.S. 315. 
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insolvency proceeding, serves here to override that concern and favor Burford 
abstention.254 
6. Avoiding Overreach 
While this hypothetical exhibits a relatively liberal approach to Burford 
abstention, that results from drawing from the Tenth Circuit’s Grimes factors, 
this approach is tempered by the additional considerations of diversity 
jurisdiction and equitable remedies. In determining the applicability of Burford 
abstention in Overflow Energy, L.L.C. v. Board of County Commissioners of 
the County of Roger Mills, the District Court for the Western District of 
Oklahoma referred to both the Grimes factors and “the more narrow 
formulation of Quackenbush and NOPSI” to reach the same result of 
abstaining.255 The court noted that “there is some basis for concluding Grimes 
may have viewed Burford abstention too broadly . . . .”256 The Court of 
Appeals for the Eight Circuit also noted in Melahn v. Pennock Insurance, Inc. 
that a lower court’s reliance on Grimes was “misplaced because Grimes was 
based mainly on Second Circuit authority which ‘adopted a broad view of 
abstention.’”257 
The formula presented here, while embracing a less stringent view of the 
effects of NOPSI and Quackenbush on Burford abstention than that held by the 
courts in Overflow Energy or Melahn, addresses these concerns through its 
additions to the Grimes factors. The considerations embodied by the final two 
factors assuage fears of unfettered application of Burford abstention in 
violation of the federal court’s duty to hear cases brought properly before it.258 
By examining whether a court is sitting in equity, the proposed formula 
discourages the invocation of Burford abstention in actions seeking 
compensatory, punitive, statutory, and reliance damages in a manner that the 
Grimes formula by itself would not address. Similarly, by examining whether 
the state would hear a remanded case brought to federal court through diversity 
jurisdiction has a direct interest in the specific outcome of the litigation, the 
 
 254 Additionally, a court could examine the comparative likelihoods of success of the alternative contract 
damages claim and unjust enrichment claim. Given the equitable nature of unjust enrichment claims, the case 
for Burford abstention would be greater if this claim was significantly more plausible than the damages claim. 
 255 Overflow Energy, L.L.C, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12860, at *9–10. 
 256 Id. at *5. 
 257 Melahn, 965 F.2d at 1507 (citing Smith, 629 F.2d at 760). 
 258 See Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 728 (The doctrine of abstention, under which a District Court may 
decline to exercise or postpone the exercise of its jurisdiction, is “an extraordinary and narrow exception to the 
duty of a District Court to adjudicate a controversy properly before it.”) (quoting Colorado River Water 
Conservation Dist., 424 U.S. at 813) (quoting County of Allegheny, 360 U.S. at 188–89). 
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proposed formula discourages Burford abstention in a manner that upholds the 
original justifications behind diversity jurisdiction.259 By guiding the process 
of evaluating the appropriateness Burford abstention, the proposed formula 
aptly follows the constitutional and policy considerations behind the doctrine’s 
development. 
CONCLUSION 
The proposed formula will help navigate the competing concerns behind 
the “troublesome and enigmatic” Burford abstention doctrine.260 Applied 
properly, the doctrine serves an essential purpose of preventing harmful 
intrusion by federal courts into state matters that can undermine important 
regulatory goals. State insolvency procedures can be rendered ineffective if 
parties know that they can concoct a way to sue an insurance company 
undergoing an insolvency proceeding in federal court. Such actions would 
disrupt the state’s ability to establish coherent policy in this area. Courts should 
recognize that NOPSI and Quackenbush served primarily to clarify the scope 
of Burford while only narrowing its parameters slightly, if at all.261 
As a result, the proposed formula remains the ideal way to apply this 
difficult doctrine in order to ensure that the policy goals set out by the Supreme 
Court in Burford v. Sun Oil, the McCarran-Ferguson Act, and the Code are 
satisfied.262 Despite the role of state insurance guarantee organizations, 
Burford abstention in the appropriate circumstances protects the insured from 
the risk of a federal lawsuit disrupting an insolvency procedure and preventing 
coverage payments. Despite the duty held by each federal court to hear cases 
brought to it under mandatory jurisdiction, sometimes the proper course of 
action is for a court to “stay its hand.”263  
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 259 See Underwood, supra note 235, at 182 (noting the often-cited justification behind diversity 
jurisdiction of avoiding bias against an out-of-state party). 
 260 Young, supra note 52, at 863.  
 261 New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 491 U.S. 350; Quackenbush, 517 U.S. 706. 
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